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CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT
Dibb v. County of San Diego,

8 Cal. 4th 1200, 94 D.A.R. 17455,
No. S035914 (Dec. 12, 1994).
CharterCounty Has Constitutional
Authority to Create Citizens'
Review Board With Power
to Issue Subpoenas
In November 1990, the voters of San
Diego County amended their County Charter by enacting section 606, which required
the County Board of Supervisors toestablish
by ordinance a Citizens Law Enforcement
Review Board (CLERB) to review and investigate citizen complaints and any deaths
of individuals arising out of or in connection
with the actions of peace officers; section
606 empowers CLERB to subpoena and
require attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers pertinent to its
investigations. Plaintiff Randy Dibb filed a
taxpayer's suit pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 526a to enjoin the County
from spending funds in order to implement
CLERB; Dibb contended that there is no
legal authority for the creation of CLERB,
and that in any event it is not legally authorized to issue subpoenas. The trial court denied Dibb's application for a permanent injunction; the Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that the Board of Supervisors is authorized to create CLERB, and that
because the California Constitution provides that county charters shall specify the
powers and duties of county officers, County
voters are also permitted to grant to CLERB,
by Charter amendment, the power to issue
subpoenas. [13:4 CRLR 224]
In affirming the Fourth District's opinion, the California Supreme Court explained
that Article XI, section 4, subdivision (h) of
the California Constitution provides that
charter counties shall have all the powers
that are provided by the Constitution or by
statute for general law counties. The court
noted that Government Code section
31001.1 permits the board of supervisors to
establish a commission of citizens to study
and report on matters within the board's
general or special interest; accordingly, the
court held that the creation and existence of
the CLERB is authorized by statute, and is
thus a proper exercise of charter county authority under the state constitution.
Although the court found that no such
statutory authority exists for the grant to
CLERB of the power to issues subpoenas,
it held that to the extent that the power to
issue subpoenas is properly grounded on

the County's authority to provide for the
powers and duties of its local officers and
the operation of its local government, it is
within the competence of the Charter. Further, the court noted that the power to issue
subpoenas is one that is often conferred
throughout the nation on boards such as
CLERB.

Griset v. Fair Political Practices
Commission,
8 Cal. 4th 851, 94 D.A.R. 16731,
No. S029701 (Nov. 28, 1994).
Statute Requiring Candidates
for Public Office To Identify
Themselves on Mass Mailings
Does Not Violate FirstAmendment
Government Code section 84305 requires candidates for public office, and
individuals or groups supporting or opposing a candidate or ballot measure, to
identify themselves on any mass mailings
they send to prospective voters. In this
case, a candidate for city council and two
committees he controlled sent prospective
voters five mass mailings that did not contain the identifying information required
by the statute. When the Fair Political
Practices Commission brought administrative charges against candidate Daniel
Griset and the two committees he controlled, Griset brought this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the statute;
he argued that persons who send prospective voters mass mailings designed to influence the outcome of an election are
entitled, under the first amendment to the
United States Constitution, to remain
anonymous, and that section 84305's requirement that such persons identify
themselves is therefore unconstitutional.
The California Supreme Court noted
that although the U.S. Supreme Court has
never addressed the precise question at
issue-whether a statute that prohibits
anonymous mass mailings by candidates
or candidate-controlled committees in political campaigns violates the first amendment, the high court in several opinions
has discussed the degree to which government entities may compel the identification of persons engaged in activities protected by the first amendment. Specifically, in three cases decided between 1958
and 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected as unconstitutional attempts by
state and local governments to require disclosure of names of persons exercising
their first amendment rights; according to
the California Supreme Court, in those
three cases, the U.S. Supreme Court established that governmental entities may not,
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absent substantial justification, compel
those engaged in first amendment activities to identify themselves when identification would impair their ability to engage
in those activities. The Supreme Court
also established that any statute requiring
disclosure must bear a reasonable relationship to the asserted governmental purpose and must be narrowly tailored to
achieve that purpose. However, in two
more recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the government's need to
ensure the integrity and reliability of the
electoral process will, at least in some
instances, provide an adequate justification to compel those exercising their first
amendment rights to identify themselves.
After reviewing the U.S. Supreme
Court's rulings on this matter, the California
Supreme Court determined that courts must
carefully examine governmental limitations
on the right of those who wish to remain
anonymous while exercising their first
amendment rights. In some circumstances,
however, the court found that the government's interests in conducting fair and honest elections and in providing prospective
voters with the information necessary to
make an informed choice may justify a requirement that persons identify themselves
when they engage in speech designed to
influence the outcome of elections.
The California Supreme Court agreed
with Griset that section 84305 implicates
first amendment rights because it prohibits anonymous political speech; however,
the court found that the second proposition of Griset's argument-that a statute
prohibiting anonymous mass mailings in
political campaigns may be upheld only if
it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest-has not been
conclusively resolved. Further, the court
concluded that whether it uses a "compelling interest" test or tests articulated by
other courts, it would conclude that section 84305 as applied to candidates and
candidate-controlled committees survives
first amendment scrutiny, and that the
state's interests that justify section 84305
are compelling. According to the court,
the primary interest asserted by the FPPC
in support of the statute at issue-to provide the voters with information to aid
them in making their choices at the ballot
box-is of sufficient magnitude to permit
restriction of the first amendment rights of
candidates (and committees controlled by
them) who wish to send political mass
mailings anonymously.
The court also noted that section 84305
does not in any way prohibit the communication of ideas; it does not attempt to
regulate the content of expression; and it
does not restrict the quantity of speech. It
18

fLITIGATION
merely requires sender identification for a
narrow range of public speech-speech
designed to influence the outcome of an
election. Thus, the court concluded that
the restraint on first amendment freedoms
is carefully limited.

G. Dennis Adams, A Judge of the
Superior Court v. Commission
on Judicial Performance,
8 Cal. 4th 630, 94 D.A.R. 15387,
No. S037475 (Oct. 31, 1994).
Judges Do Not Have
ConstitutionalRight to
ConfidentialDisciplinary
HearingsInvolving Charges
of Moral Turpitude
Under the authority of the state constitution, the Commission on Judicial Performance initiates and oversees proceedings for
the censure, removal, retirement, or private
admonishment of a judge; the state constitution also provides that if, after conducting a
preliminary investigation, the Commission
by vote determines that formal proceedings
should be instituted against a judge, the
Commission may-in the pursuit of public
confidence and the interests of justiceissue press statements or releases or, in the
event charges involve moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, open hearings to the
public. In this proceeding, San Diego
County Superior Court Judge G. Dennis
Adams, who was charged by the Commission with numerous counts involving moral
turpitude, contended that the open hearing
provisions of the state constitution, as implemented, violate the California Constitution's provisions for separation of powers,
and that the open hearing procedure is void
as an unconstitutional exercise of judicial
power.
The California Supreme Court rejected
Adams' arguments, noting that the state constitution provides that "[tihe powers of state
government are legislative, executive, and
judicial. Persons charged with the exercise
of one power may not exercise either of the
others except as permitted by this constitution." The court explained that the Commission was created by constitutional amendment; the Commission's authority to order
that a hearing be open is similarly part of the
constitution. For these and other reasons, the
court held that the Commission's authority
to order an open hearing where the constitutional criteria are met does not constitute an
unconstitutional usurpation of judicial
power.
Adams also argued that, in determining
whether the charges involve moral turpitude,
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the Commission must consider not only
the charges specified in the notice of formal proceedings, but also the defenses and
explanations asserted by the judge in
his/her answer to the charges. The court
rejected this contention, noting that prior
to making the determination whether
charges involve moral turpitude, the Commission already will have-among other
things-reviewed and assessed a significant
body of information pertinent to the complaint of misconduct, including all material
provided by the judge that he/she believes to
be relevant and material to the evaluation of
the accusations, and that may explain, justify, or place in context the conduct in question. Thus, the court found that a determination that charges involve moral turpitude is
based not upon the particular language chosen by the Commission in framing the formal written charges, but rather upon the
Commission's independent preliminary assessment of the judge's conduct and the
reliability and truth of the allegations, including evidence relating to the motivation
of the judge as well as his/her explanation
for the alleged misconduct uncovered by the
Commission in its preliminary investigation. The court also held that "even if the
facts alleged in the notice of formal proceedings did not necessarily or unavoidably involve moral turpitude, the Commission nevertheless had the discretion to determine that
the particular facts established in the course
of its investigation, and the decision to file
formal charges, justified the conclusion that
the judge's actions did involve moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption" within the
meaning of the state constitution.
Finally, the court addressed Judicial
Council Rule 907.2, which establishes a procedure enabling the Commission, in the
event any of the charges involve moral turpitude, to open the hearing on all charges, if
doing so would promote public confidence
and the interests of justice. The court explained that the Judicial Council, as an independent agency charged with a specialized
and focused task of promulgating rules implementing an open hearing procedure in
judicial disciplinary proceedings, is the entity presumably equipped or informed by
experience to perform such task, and whose
findings warrant deferential treatment by the
court. The court went on to hold that the
"Judicial Council reasonably could conclude
that...the goal of public confidence in the
judiciary and in the disciplinary procedure
might not be furthered if the public were
permitted to observe only a portion of the
proceedings, leaving to speculation the nature and gravity of the other alleged misconduct and its relationship to the moral turpitude charges."

CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v.
State Board of Funeral Directors
and Embalmers,
28 Cal. App. 4th 1470,
94 D.A.R. 14180,
No. CO 11460 (Oct. 7, 1994).
Open Meeting Act Requires
Justificationfor Closed Sessions of
State Board of FuneralDirectors
In this proceeding, the Third District
Court of Appeal again decided several important issues applicable to state agencies
arising under the Bagley-Keene Open
Meeting Act, Government Code section
11120 et seq. [14:4 CRLR 22] Among
other things, the court found the following:
- The court interpreted the "pending
litigation" exception to the Act's open
meeting requirement, Government Code
section 11126(q), which permits state bodies "to confer, and receive advice from,
legal counsel," to include the communication of facts (as well as legal advice) from
legal counsel, and to include the state
body's deliberations and decisionmaking
thereon.
- With regard to the Act's procedural
requirements accompanying the use of the
"pending litigation" exception, the court
noted that section 11126(q) requires the
state body's legal counsel to prepare and
submit to it, preferably prior to the closed
session but no later than one week after the
closed session, a memorandum stating the
specific reasons and legal authority for the
closed session. The court rejected the
Board's assertion of a "substantial compliance" defense for failure to comply with
these procedures.
- The court also interpreted section
11126(d), which-at the time relevant to
this litigation-provided that state bodies
may meet in closed session "to deliberate
on a decision to be reached based upon
evidence introduced in a proceeding required to be conducted pursuant to [the
Administrative Procedure Act]." Because
the language of the statute expressly contemplated (1) deliberation, (2) decision,
(3) evidence, and (4) APA proceedings,
the court held that state bodies are not
permitted to meet in closed session under
section 11126(d) to consider petitions to
terminate license probation, for license
reinstatement, or to reduce a penalty unless it has previously held an APA hearing
to receive evidence on the licensee's reha-
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bilitation. Further, the court held that state
bodies may not meet under section 11126(d)
to consider proposed disciplinary settlements which involve a stipulated set of
facts: "Subdivision (d)...does not permit
deliberations to provide cover for receiving and considering evidence in closed
session. It is only deliberation, and not the
introduction of evidence, which can be
conducted in closed sessions pursuant to
the subdivision (d) exception." To the extent that evaluation of a proposed settlement is part of the Board's litigation strategy, the court found that it may be reviewed with legal counsel under section
11126(q), but not under section 11126(d).
The court noted that several of the Board's
arguments for closed sessions to consider
stipulated settlements are better addressed
to the legislature, because "subdivision
(d) simply does not go that far."
- And once again, the court held that
the Board's two-member advisory committees are state bodies under section
11121.7, and fully subject to the Act's
open meeting requirement. Although twomember advisory committees of a state
body appear to be exempt from the open
meeting requirement under section 11121.8,
the court held, in effect, that when even
one member of a state body serves on an
advisory committee in his/her official capacity as a representative of the state body,
and the state body finances the member's
participation, the open meeting requirements of the Bagley-Keene Act "follow"
that member and his/her official participation.
On November 7, the Third District denied the Board's motions for rehearing
and for depublication of its decision. On
January 5, the California Supreme Court
denied the Board's petition for review but
depublished the Third District's decision,
thus negating the precedential impact of
five years of litigation.

Dixon v. Superior Court,
Scientific Resource Surveys, et

al., Real Parties in Interest,
30 Cal. App. 4th 733,
94 D.A.R. 16878,
No. G015646 (Nov. 30, 1994).
Statements Made DuringPublic
Comment and Review Process
are Absolutely Immune From
Tort Liability
In this matter, a university professor
filed harsh comments during a public
comment period after a consulting group
issued a negative declaration of adverse
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environmental impact regarding a proposed development project; the comments
caused the consulting group to lose the
project, so it sued the professor for libel,
slander, and intentional and negligent interference with contractual relations and
prospective advantage. The professor
moved to strike the complaint on grounds
it constitutes a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation) suit; Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16, added by
SB 1264 (Lockyer) (Chapter 16, Statutes
of 1992) [12:4 CRLR 244] provides that a
cause of action against a person arising
from any act of a person in furtherance of
that person's right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California constitution in connection with a public issue is subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim.
In this proceeding, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal clarified that a party moving to strike under section 425.16 has the
burden of making a prima facie showing
that the lawsuit arises from any act in
furtherance of his/her right of petition or
free speech under the U.S. or California
constitution in connection with a public
issue. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish a probability of prevailing on its
claim. The Fourth District vacated the trial
court's denial of the motion to strike, and
ordered the lower court to grant the motion
and dismiss the complaint.

PROPOSITION 187
LEGAL CHALLENGES
The day after California voters approved
Proposition 187-the so-called "Save Our
State" anti-illegal immigration initiative
[14:4 CRLR 28-291-in the November 8,
1994 election, attorneys filed eight separate legal challenges to the measure in
state and federal courts; the plaintiffs in
those actions include the California
League of United Latin American Citizens, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Center
for Human Rights and Constitutional Law.
The following is a status update on the
challenges to the initiative:
- Federal Court. On November 16,
Chief U.S. District Judge Win. Matthew
Byrne Jr. issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the implementation of the
most controversial elements of the measure; among other things, Byrne found
that some of the proposition's provisions
"conflict with federal law." Byrne also
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criticized the measure for having internal
conflicts, noting that "[i]t looks like this
was drafted by one person in one section
and another person in another section."
Byrne set a status conference before U.S.
District Court Judge Mariana Pfaelzer for
November 21 to finalize the date for a
hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. At the status conference,
Pfaelzer scheduled a December 14 hearing on the preliminary injunction; Pfaelzer
also issued an order prohibiting the state
from promulgating any Proposition 187implementing regulations without the further order of the court.
Following the December 14 hearing,
Pfaelzer issued the preliminary injunction, thereby prohibiting enforcement of
the challenged provisions of the measure
until a trial determines their constitutionality; Pfaelzer found that most of the measure will probably be found unconstitutional, and its enforcement would cause
many people to suffer irreparable harm
because they would go without medical
care, be kicked out of public school, or fail
to report crimes and abuse to police.
On January 13, Pfaelzer announced
that she will require state officials to distribute copies of her ruling by January 30
to all affected agencies, to ensure that state
personnel know that key provisions of
Proposition 187 may not be enforced at
this time.
- State Court. On November 9, San
Francisco Superior Court Judge Stuart
Pollak also blocked enforcement of certain aspects of Proposition 187; specifically, Judge Pollak issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of
the measure's requirement that undocumented immigrants be kicked out of the
state's public schools, as well as public
colleges and universities. Pollak noted
that the provision conflicts with Plyler v.
Doe, a 1982 U.S. Supreme Court ruling
requiring states to provide a public education to all residents. Pollak's order will
remain in effect until at least February 8,
when he is scheduled to hold a hearing on
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.
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